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TRUTH AND INNOCENCE PROCEDURES TO FREE INNO-
CENT PERSONS: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Tim Bakken*
Through innocent pleas and innocence procedures, this Article urges a fundamen-
tal change to the adversarial system to minimize the risk that factually innocent
persons will be convicted of crimes. The current system, based on determining
whether the prosecution can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, results in ac-
quittals of guilty persons when evidence is sparse and convictions of innocent
persons when evidence is abundant. It might be easier philosophically to accept
that guilty persons will go free than to know that some innocent persons will be
convicted and imprisoned, especially in the American justice system where errone-
ous jury verdicts based on factual determinations are virtually never reversed.
Thus, where defendants claim to be factually innocent, the adversarial system
should provide for a plea of innocent, as opposed to only a not guilty plea, as well
as innocence procedures through which to search for the truth of the prosecution's
allegations. Innocence procedures would require the defendant and the prosecution
to engage in a truth-seeking function. The prosecution would have to investigate
with a view toward finding exculpatory evidence, rather than expecting the defen-
dant to produce it. The defendant would have to submit to interrogation, and his
attorney would have to affirm that the defendant is innocent. Jury instructions at
trial would ensure that the prosecution and defendant acted in good faith, and
where a defendant pleaded innocent, submitted to interrogation, and then still
faced trial the prosecution would be required to prove guilt to a standard higher
than beyond a reasonable doubt. By introducing a truth-seeking function into the
adversarial system prior to trial, innocent persons would have a more realistic op-
portunity to save themselves, when in the current system their fates are virtually
irrevocably sealed when a jury returns a guilty verdict.
INTRODUCTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
This Article proposes a fundamental change to the adversarial
system and the American criminal justice process. Specifically, it
urges the adoption of truth-seeking innocence procedures de-
signed to minimize convictions of innocent defendants. The
Article's main premise is that a search for truth is the most effective
* The author is a professor of law at the United States Military Academy at West
Point. He conducted research for this Article while a research scholar at New York Law
School and a visiting scholar at the Columbia University School of Law. He is a former
homicide prosecutor of the Kings County (Brooklyn) District Attorney's Office in New York
City.
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means through which to discover innocence.' Unfortunately, how-
ever, this premise does not currently underlie the adversarial
system, where the cost of requiring the government to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt' instead of searching for truth is that
guilty persons will go free when evidence is lacking and innocent
persons will be convicted and imprisoned when evidence is abun-
dant.3 The absence of innocence procedures, or some better
method through which to discover innocence, has in part resulted
in the conviction and imprisonment of hundreds, or perhaps even
thousands, of innocent persons in a recent fifteen-year time pe-
riod.4
In the current adversarial system, the mechanisms available to
discover innocence are few and often impossible for innocent per-
sons to access. Academics and practitioners have proposed several
reforms to address the crisis caused by the convictions of innocent
persons. In essence, these proposals focus on improving current
criminal procedures, such as making witness identifications more
reliable, ensuring that confessions are not coerced, and sanction-
ing prosecutors and police officers for improper actions.' However,
1. In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986), the Supreme Court examined defense
attorneys' obligations to their clients and found that an attorney's refusal to cooperate with
a defendant's perjury at trial is "consistent with the governance of trial conduct in what we
have long called 'a search for truth.'" The Court's conclusion seems more of an aspiration
than a real tenet of the adversarial system, where the focus is on whether the prosecution
can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-65
(1970) (holding that Due Process requires the government to prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt). In the adversarial system, there might be legal guilt in the absence of a correct
verdict, such as where a factually innocent person is convicted.
2. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 364-65 (requiring that the prosecution prove charges
beyond a reasonable doubt).
3. A long-standing debate over protecting the innocent has led to various proposed
ratios between how many guilty should go free so that one innocent may avoid punishment.
See generally, Alexander Volokh, Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 174, 182--84 (1997) (cit-
ing Blackstone for the proposition that "ten guilty persons [should] escape... [to protect]
one innocent [from] suffer[ing,]" and Fortescue for the proposition that the ratio should be
set at twenty-to-one to avoid that one innocent execution.).
4. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524, 532 (2005) (finding, between 1989 and 2003, 340 exon-
erations-"an official act declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime for which he or she had
previously been convicted"-and suggesting the possibility that over 29,000 persons should
have been exonerated in the period studied). One organization, The Innocence Project, at
the Benjamin Cardozo Law School, claims that 205 persons have been exonerated based on
DNA evidence alone. Press Release, Innocence Project, Byron Halsey Is Fully Exonerated in
New Jersey After DNA Proves His Innocence in 1985 Child Rapes and Murders (July 9,
2007), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/689.php.
5. See Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1123, 1128 (2005) (arguing that "a tolerance for error has become woven
into the fabric of the legal rules," such as those concerning pretrial release, venue, pretrial
delay, joinder and severance, government disclosure, and guilty pleas); Jacqueline
McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
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while each proposal seeks to improve the adversarial system, no
proposal suggests changing the structure of the system so that de-
fendants asserting innocence can compel the government and
courts to search for truth.
This Article details specific innocence procedures. First, defen-
dants would be entitled to plead "innocent." As a result of an
innocent plea, the prosecution would be required, absent a com-
pelling justification, to faithfully investigate the truth of
defendants' innocence claims, as opposed to focusing on deter-
mining whether guilt can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In
return for the prosecution's innocence investigation, the defen-
dant would agree to cooperate with the prosecution, thus revealing
virtually his entire defense. Specifically, a defendant claiming inno-
cence would agree to waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent6 and Sixth Amendment right to some confidential communi-
cations with an attorney.
In some cases, even after interviewing defendants who plead in-
nocent and examining their claims and evidence, the government
may remain convinced of a defendant's guilt and choose to pro-
ceed to trial. Then, an innocent defendant would normally have
little or no chance of an acquittal. That is, assuming good faith, the
prosecution may not believe the defendant's claims and would
then possess adequate evidence to prove the defendant guilty at
trial. Moreover, by exposing his case to the prosecution, the defen-
dant would have lost any competitive advantage typically gleaned
from the adversarial system. To protect a defendant who, in part,
entrusts the government with his innocence claim, new criminal
procedures would mandate the following protections at trial:
1. The government would be required to prove guilt
to a higher standard than beyond a reasonable
doubt;
2. Jurors could infer innocence from an innocent
plea;
Rav. 1271, 1275, 1280 (2005) (arguing that mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading
cause of wrongful convictions and that false confessions account for fifteen to twenty-five
percent of wrongful convictions); The Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
University Law School, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/Causes/
eyewjtnessstudy01 .htm.
6. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in virtually all
civil and criminal proceedings in federal and state jurisdictions. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000) (clarifying
that the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), requiring warnings
before the statements of a defendant in custody may be used in court, was based on the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment requirement and not a Court rule).
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3. Jurors could draw inferences favorable to the de-
fendant from the defendant's prompt claim of
innocence;
4. Jurors could presume that evidence and leads pre-
sented by the defendant but not pursued by the
government would have been favorable to the de-
fendant; and
5. Jurors could acquit the defendant upon finding that
the government acted in bad faith.
Thus, to minimize the number of convictions of innocent per-
sons, this Article urges a fundamental restructuring of the
adversarial system. Part I distinguishes between factually innocent
persons, who should never be convicted, and factually guilty per-
sons, who should always be convicted, absent an applicable legal or
policy consideration. Part II describes how the adversarial process
is extremely dangerous for innocent defendants. Currently, inno-
cent defendants must plead with prosecutors informally to
investigate their claims of innocence. As a result, they expose their
defenses to the prosecution far in advance of trial. Innocent de-
fendants' only other alternative is to vigorously resist conviction
and challenge the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. This strategy risks presenting ajury with conflicting
and inconsistent defenses that might seem incredible, such as "I
am innocent of the crime. But, if it appears from the evidence that
I might have committed the crime, I urge you to find me not guilty
because the prosecution did not present evidence sufficient to
prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Part III describes how a search for truth would help reform the
adversarial system. Part IV details innocence procedures and the
obligations of defendants and prosecutors that would be triggered
by a defendant's plea of innocent. Part V contains considerations
and arguments that might undermine the rationale for innocence
procedures, as well as refutations of those arguments. In particular,
Part V focuses on whether jurors' knowledge of formal pleas of in-
nocent would lead jurors to perceive that a defendant who pleads
"only" not guilty is more likely to be guilty than the defendant who
pleads innocent.
The Article concludes with a discussion of how innocence pro-
cedures would re-orient the focus of actors within the justice
system. In exchange for obtaining defendants' evidence, prosecu-
tors would have to investigate defendants' innocence claims to
avoid adverse jury instructions. In addition, depending on the par-
ties' compliance with innocence procedures, judges would have to
[VOL. 41:3
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determine what additional instructions would be necessary to sub-
mit to the jury. In essence, the justice system would be more
focused on achieving a correct result in cases where a criminal de-
fendant knows he is truly innocent and formally pleads innocent.
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: FREEING INNOCENT AND
GUILTY PERSONS
The number of innocent persons released from prison7 demon-
strates the critical need for the creation of innocence procedures
and the attendant plea of "innocent." Indeed, the revolutionary
use of scientific evidence" to prove innocence conclusively 9 leads to
questions regarding whether the adversarial system can effectively
ensure that large numbers of innocent persons will not be con-
victed. ° In light of the problem presented by convictions of
innocent persons, academics and practitioners have proposed a
series of reforms, arguing, for example, that the role of defense
attorneys should evolve to encompass more effective fact-finding,"
7. At least several hundred innocent persons have been exonerated since 1989. See
Gross et al., supra note 4; Innocence Project, supra note 4.
8. See generally Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,
49 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 421, 422-24 (2001) (concluding that the exonerations arising from the
use of DNA evidence and the standards for admissibility of evidence under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993), where the Court held that scientific validity
is the key to admissibility, have brought into question the forensic science that has been
used in courts for the past century).
9. In examining eighty-six cases where defendants were exonerated, The Center on
Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University Law School, found that faulty eyewitness
testimony affected the convictions of forty-six (53.5%) of the eighty-six defendants. The
Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University Law School, supra note 5. "The
average (mean) time between the arrest of the defendant and his or her exoneration in the
eyewitness cases was 95 months-just short of 8 years." Id. The Center indicated that other
reasons for erroneous convictions were police and prosecutorial misconduct, the (estimony
of informants, unreliable science, and false or coerced confessions. Id.
10. See, e.g., Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 Am.
J. CRIM. L. 1, 59 (1995) (urging that "a basic inquisitorial control, the requirement of 'rea-
soned judgment,' be incorporated into all nonjury criminal cases"); Lissa Griffin, The
Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 1241, 1307
(2001) (advocating for post-conviction challenges and the creation of "a meaningful forum
for the receipt and investigation of new evidence," akin to Britain's Criminal Cases Review
Commission, which has the authority to investigate and examine cases for error after the
appeals process); Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an
Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 451 (1994) (disapproving
Britain's curtailment of suspects' right to remain silent, such as during police questioning,
without suffering adverse consequences and the move toward inquisitorial processes, while
favoring the adversarial system as a method to protect "many of the characteristics of an
open and democratic society").
11. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1591 (2005) (discussing the justice system's evolution
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and that prosecutors should be more amenable to defense claims
of innocence." Others maintain that identification processes
should be more reliable, interrogation methods should be more
refined, 14 "unsafe" jury verdicts should be subjected to more rigor-
ous post-trial scrutiny,15 police officers should be more honest, 6
and judges should be better.7 Moving beyond practical suggestions
about criminal procedures, others argue that prosecutors should
be more open-minded' and subject to more frequent or severe
punishment.' 9 It seems that few expect the current system to pro-
from adversarial adjudication to a system more akin to administrative decision-making, in-
cluding reforms aimed at supplementing weakened defense counsel and refocusing them
on tasks such as scrutinizing government evidence).
12. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 125-32 (2004) (noting recent moves by prosecutors to rem-
edy the problem of wrongful convictions, but also noting that prosecutors can have negative
impacts on post-conviction innocence claims, both with regard to DNA testing and a prose-
cutor's cooperation or lack thereof with defense counsel, and concluding that prosecutorial
resistance to post-conviction claims remains a problem, but that some reform is possible).
13. See, e.g., McMurtrie, supra note 5, at 1275 (finding that eyewitness identification is
the leading cause of wrongful convictions); Saks, supra note 8, at 424.
14. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need
for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness
of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 622-24 (2004) (advocating recording police interroga-
tions of suspects as the key method to prevent false confessions). But see Paul G. Cassell, The
Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Con-
fessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 524-26 (1999) (challenging the proposition that
improper interrogations are leading to a relatively large number of convictions).
15. See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial
and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1281, 1331-33 (2004) (arguing that
trial and appellate courts should "carry a special obligation when a conviction was under-
girded primarily with evidence known to be of questionable reliability, such as stranger-on-
stranger eyewitness identification or 'jailhouse snitch' testimony."). Although I conceived
the phase "innocence procedures" and the concepts associated with them independently
and prior to knowing about or reading Professor Risinger's article, it should be noted that it
was Professor Risinger who apparently was first to publish the term "innocence procedures."
He wrote: "However, it does not seem appropriate to give the defendant the untrammeled
right to trigger special actual innocence procedures unilaterally and without judicial evaluation
of the propriety and sufficiency of the circumstances alleged to make out an actual binary
exterior-fact claim." Id. 1312 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Po-
lice Perjury, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1259, 1284-85 (2005) (arguing for repeal of absolute
immunity for law enforcement witnesses in an effort to remedy the problems stemming
from perjured police testimony).
17. See, e.g., Hans Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in the Generation of Wrongful Convic-
tions, 30 N. Ky. L. REv. 539, 540 (2003) (offering a critique of thejudiciary's role in wrongful
convictions in an effort to move toward decreasing their frequency).
18. See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49
How. L.J. 475, 493 (2006) (concluding that psychological, social, and moral factors result in
premature prosecutorial decisions).
19. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seri-
ously, 8 D.C. L. REv. 275, 297-98 (2004) (arguing for a system that will hold more
prosecutors accountable and proposing an independent commission to examine alleged
prosecutorial misconduct).
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mote truth. Certainly, no reform proposal has as its central premise
the requirement that the government and courts search for truth
as the primary means to free innocent persons.
In contrast, the innocence procedures advanced in this Article
provide an additional mechanism within the adversarial system to
allow innocent persons to distinguish themselves from guilty per-
sons. That is, most would concede that innocent and guilty persons
are different from a moral perspective. Additionally, most would
agree that a factually guilty person should almost always be con-
victed. It is true that a factually guilty person might also be a
wrongfully convicted person. For example, police actions that
might justify the exclusion of evidence needed to convict,' ° per-
jured testimony,2' a new rule of law,2 or prosecutorial abuse 3 might
require a new trial or even the dismissal of the charges against a
guilty person. Still, a factually guilty, but wrongfully convicted, per-
son is morally culpable. In contrast to a factually guilty person, a
factually innocent person has no moral responsibility and should
not be legally responsible, provided the facts are adduced accu-
rately and the law applied properly. However, through some error
in the justice process, the innocent person, like the guilty person,
might nonetheless be wrongfully convicted.
There are at least two types of factual innocence, one of which is
more amenable to the application of innocence procedures. The
first type of factual innocence, to which innocence procedures are
less applicable, involves a factual dispute to which the fact-finder
must apply a legal rule. This occurs, for example, when a defen-
dant claims that his homicidal act was justified by the law of self-
defense. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, a jury might find this
factually innocent person guilty of murder even though a proper
application of the law of self-defense to the universally objective
facts would show that the defendant's action was legally justified.
However, at trial, those facts might not have been reported
20. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule applica-
ble to the states).
21. See Brian Murray & Joseph C. Rosa, He Lies, You Die: Criminal Tials, 7Tith, Perjury,
and Fairness, 27 NEw ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 21-25 (2001) (discussing how
convicted persons might challenge perjury by an adverse witness and obtain a new trial, and
suggesting that the standard for judicial evaluation of perjury should be uniform, not differ-
ent based on whether the defendant is making a motion for a new trial under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 33 or attacking a conviction via habeas corpus).
22. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-305 (1989) (detailing complicated principles
to determine when to apply rules of law retroactively).
23. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convic-
tions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WiNs. L. REv. 399 (discussing the roots of
prosecutorial misconduct and proposing measures to help curtail it).
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accurately or completely, or the jury might not have perceived the
facts accurately. In any event, the case required the jury to apply
law to facts, and a universally objective evaluation of the case would
have resulted in an acquittal.
When jurors err in such a case, that is, when they misapply the
law to the facts presented and engage in faulty or inaccurate men-
tal judgments, convicted defendants will find it virtually impossible
to overturn the resulting guilty verdicts. This is because judgments
about factual disputes are almost exclusively within the province of
the designated fact-finder, either a trial judge or a jury.4 In es-
sence, the error that the convicted defendant alleges--even if the
allegation is true and the jury's verdict is wrong-will not be a basis
for reversing the conviction. The jury's error is therefore an ac-
ceptable cost of the adversarial system, if for no other reason than
that the system has no means to correct the error.
The second kind of factual innocence does not implicate any
question of law and is not dependent directly on the fact finder's
application of law to facts. Every reasonable person viewing the
universally objective facts in this type of case would always conclude
that the defendant is innocent. To illustrate, this factually innocent
person would be one who was in another country at the time the
solitary robber committed a robbery in the United States. In other
words, to correct the jury's error, one could merely look at the uni-
versally objective fact of the case (that the defendant was in
another country) without ever having to probe the mental proc-
esses or capabilities of the jurors who issued the objectively wrong
verdict. There would be no issue of whether the jury properly ap-
plied the law to the facts. In this instance, even within the
adversarial system, the jury's erroneous guilty verdict is always un-
acceptable, although some might consider it a justifiable cost
inherent in a utilitarian system premised on adversarial processes.
This second type of factual innocence-where every reasonable
person viewing the facts would conclude that the defendant is in-
nocent-is the subject of this Article.
24. FED R. CRIM. P. 32(j) permits appeals of convictions. But see infra notes 32, 50, 51
and accompanying text (discussing why findings of fact will almost never be overturned on
appeal or through habeas corpus).
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM ON
INNOCENT PERSONS
A. The Limitations of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In moving beyond the adversarial model, the justice system
should first modify its approach to the concept of reasonable
doubt. The reasonable doubt standard implies a philosophical and
practical acceptance that a certain number of innocent persons
will be convicted when the evidence points, erroneously, toward
guilt. Indeed, the current U. S. system is focused on whether the
prosecution can meet its burden of proof.25 The system has no
method through which to examine how to extricate innocent de-
fendants where the evidence erroneously establishes their guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unsurprisingly, hundreds of innocent defendants have been ex-
onerated and recently released from prison, when the real number
of innocent convicted persons might be in the thousands.26 This
harsh reality seems to be embodied in the widespread premise that
an acceptable cost of the current justice system is that some inno-
cent persons will be convicted and never exonerated. Of course, the
world is not fair, and only the naive would believe that no innocent
person will ever be convicted. However, the purpose of innocence
procedures is to compel a more thorough search for accuracy and
thereby reduce the number of convictions of innocent persons
without reducing the number of convictions of guilty persons.
The need for reform is poignantly illustrated by an ironic dispar-
ity in procedural rights allocated to innocent and guilty
defendants. For example, an innocent defendant who knows, of
course, that he is innocent, has no procedural right to compel the
government to search for any exculpatory evidence. In contrast,
the government, in every case, is required to notify every defen-
dant, whether guilty or innocent, about the existence of
exculpatory evidence, even where the defendant knows he is guilty
and the evidence could result in the guilty defendant's wrongful
25. The Constitution does not require a particular form in explaining to the jury the
meaning of reasonable doubt, but the jury instructions must correctly convey the concept of
a reasonable doubt. See Victor v. Nebraska 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) ("[T]aken as a whole, the
instructions [must) correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." (quot-
ing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). The burden of proof requires the
government to produce evidence that creates a prima facie appearance of guilt and per-
suade the jury (or judge) that the evidence produced establishes the government's
proposition that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
26. See Gross et al., supra note 4; Innocence Project, supra note 4.
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acquittal . In one sense, of course, innocent and guilty defendants
have equal rights in that the government must reveal exculpatory
evidence to both of them. However, such a process might not
achieve a just result. In a just system, every innocent defendant
should be able to acquire additional evidence that would rightfully
exonerate him while no guilty defendant should be able to acquire
additional evidence that would wrongfully exonerate him.
In addition, through the exclusionary rule, guilty (and inno-
cent) defendants have many opportunities to eliminate
government evidence that indicates their guilt. In a perfect and
just system, guilty defendants should not be able to escape convic-
tion through the elimination of such probative, truth-revealing
evidence. Furthermore, guilty persons may inhibit the collection of
probative evidence by refusing to testify 29 and thus avoiding an ad-
mission of guilt (assuming, theoretically, that they would not
commit perjury while testifying). Upon their refusal to testify and
subsequent silence, guilty defendants may then compel the trial
judge to direct jurors not to draw any adverse inference from their
refusal to testify and subsequent silence.0 In contrast, an innocent
person who testifies exposes himself to cross-examination and is not
entitled to a favorable jury instruction. In an odd twist, the innocent
defendant who testifies will often be punished for doing so. That is,
the prosecution may request that the judge instruct the jury that the
defendant who testifies is an "interested witness," thus implying that
the defendant, despite being innocent, is less likely to be truthful
because he has a substantial interest in the outcome of the case.
27. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that Due Process requires
the prosecution to reveal exculpatory evidence that affects guilt or punishment).
28. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-50, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
rule, which prevents the use of improperly collected evidence in a criminal trial, applies in
state prosecutions).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that
"the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States" in virtually all civil and
criminal proceedings).
30. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky; 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (holding "that a state trial judge
has the constitutional obligation, upon proper request [by the defendant], to minimize the
danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify" by instructing
the jurors that they may draw no adverse inference from the defendant's silence).
31. See Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), where the Court approved the fol-
lowing jury instruction after the defendant had testified:
You should especially look to the interest which the respective witnesses have in the
suit or in its result. Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of
the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts. The law per-
mits the defendant, at his own request, to testify in his own behalf. The defendant
here has availed himself of this privilege. His testimony is before you and you must
determine how far it is credible. The deep personal interest which he may have in the
556 [VOL. 41:3
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B. The Difficulty of Obtaining Post-Conviction Relief in the
Adversarial System
Although practical impediments and legal rules constrain every
defendant, the adversarial system can be particularly difficult for
32innocent persons to navigate after conviction. All actors in the
post-conviction process-defense attorneys, prosecutors, and ap-
pellate judges-are limited in searching for truth by the rules and
roles unique to their institutional positions within the adversarial
system. For example, the most significant practical loss to the inno-
cent person might be the right to a publicly funded attorney. While
defendants are entitled to attorneys through trial33 and through an
appeal34 if the state offers one,'35 the right is severely weakened by a
result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence and in de-
termining how far or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit.
Id. at 304.
32. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a), a court "may vacate any judgment and grant a new
trial if the interest of justice so requires." Id. However, Rule 33(b)(1) requires that newly
discovered evidence be raised via motion "within 3 years after the verdict or finding of
guilty." Id. 33(b)(1). Where newly discovered evidence is not at issue, a "motion ...
grounded on any other reason ... must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of
guilty." Id. 33(b) (2). Rule 33(a) might not provide relief to many innocent persons because
new evidence can arise at any time, including long after the verdict. See, e.g., Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993) (rejecting relief in a federal habeas proceeding where ten
years after conviction the petitioner presented affidavits indicating his brother admitted to
the murder for which the petitioner had been convicted).
For an overview of the difficulty of obtaining post-conviction relief see Griffin, supra note
10, at 1292 (noting that the federal and state court procedures for granting a new trial are
highly restrictive and that, therefore, the courts rarely grant a new trial). See also Daniel S.
Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA
Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARiz. L. REV. 655, 658-60 (2005) (discussing the structural im-
pediments in state post-conviction regimes to proving one's innocence through new
evidence); cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400 (declining to require a state court to hear new evi-
dence given the relevant state rule and that the Court could provide no habeas relief
because, "federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation
of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact").
A defendant who is barred by a state procedural rule from introducing newly discovered
evidence is not completely without an opportunity to challenge his conviction under federal
habeas corpus, but the defendant's evidentiary burden is very high, rising to the level of a
"miscarriage-of-justice," such that "prisoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted
claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, 'it is more likely than not that no rea-
sonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' House v.
Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076-77 (2006) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
33. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments mandate publicly-funded attorneys for indigent defendants
through trial).
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
35. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 270 n.5 (2000) ("The Constitution does not...
require states to create appellate review in the first place." (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S.
600, 606 (1974))).
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lack of defense resources for investigation and effective individual
representation.36 Unfortunately, defendants' need for effective rep-
resentation becomes more critical after the first appeal or the
exhaustion of all appeals. Years or decades after the conviction, old
evidence might be subjected to new scientific tests. Witnesses
might recant or admit mistakes, or their perjury at trial might be
exposed. 7 An incarcerated defendant with no attorney, or an
overwhelmed one, has little opportunity to vindicate his innocence
in this post-conviction adversarial atmosphere.
After conviction, an innocent defendant might argue for the
first time that he is innocent, a claim that while truthful may ap-
pear inconsistent and incredible to prosecutors. This is because,
almost always, that same defendant argued at trial that the prose-
cution's evidence did not establish proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, an unsurprising and natural argument. That is, if that de-
fendant had instead claimed innocence at trial, he would have
created in the jurors' minds a virtual presumption that he must
prove who committed the crime, a burden few defendants would
accept as part of their defense. Rather than trying to find and
prove who really committed the crime, the defendant will assert a
simpler and easier defense by arguing that the prosecution's evi-
dence does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, but naturally, the defendant's early argument that
the prosecution's evidence is lacking stands in sharp contrast to his
later, post-conviction argument that he is innocent.
The moral power of a defendant's tardy and incongruent inno-
cence claim, while true, is lost. In turn, a prosecutor's willingness
to question the evidence will diminish after every judicial proceed-
ing where the innocent defendant's legal culpability has been
confirmed. These proceedings include the trial judge's denial of a
36. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1332 (2006) (noting a defense funding crisis that prevents
effective investigation and representation, where, for example, an appointed attorney's
caseload consisted of 300 criminal cases in a year as well as a private practice consisting of
paying clients).
37. A witness who committed perjury at trial and then dies can never recant and pro-
vide testimony to exculpate a convicted innocent person. As long as the convicted person
cannot prove the perjury, the perjurer's false testimony (known only to the defendant and
the perjurer to be false) from the first trial can be reintroduced by the prosecution through
a reading of the trial transcript at any subsequent proceeding or trial. See Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972) (permitting the reading of the testimony of the key witness
from the first trial where that witness was unavailable for the re-trial ten years later). Police
officers whose memories fade might not be able to remember additional circumstances of
an interrogation or identification if those circumstances are made relevant by a new court
ruling.
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motion for a judgment of acquittal after the government's case;"
the jury's verdict;3 9 the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for
a new trial;4 the innocent person's recent, post-conviction claim of
innocence; appellate courts' affirmations of convictions;1 and fed-
eral courts' denials of habeas corpus relief.
42
The claims of factually innocent persons are diluted further by
other innocent persons, whose claims of innocence depend not
only on facts but also on the application of the law to those facts.
Thus, innocent persons who suffered a jury's mistaken application
of law to facts are unlikely ever to have their convictions reversed 3
because the justice system is not capable of examining and correct-
ing the mental processes of the jurors that caused their mistake in
judgment. Faced with several types of defendants' claims-factual
innocence based on facts, factual innocence based on facts and
law, and guilty but wrongly convicted because of a mistake of law-
prosecutors, on whom innocent persons depend, might find late,
but truthful, claims of innocence to be unbelievable. Therefore,
in confronting late innocence claims, except where physical evi-
dence can objectively indicate factual innocence, 45 prosecutors will
38. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) ("After the government closes its evidence or after the
close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.").
39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (requiring unanimous verdicts).
40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a) ("Upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate
any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. If the case was tried
without ajury, the court may take additional testimony and enter a new judgment.").
41. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253-54, 1291 (2000) (appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court and
federal circuit courts).
42. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55 (2000) (state defendants' habeas and federal defendants'
habeas); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (limiting federal courts' habeas review
to constitutional, not factual, issues).
43. See supra note 32, infra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text (discussing why rever-
sals of factual decisions are rare).
44. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1614-24 (2006) (arguing that prosecutors
suffer cognitive failures, which might be remedied through education on cognitive bias,
reversing roles and taking the position of the defense, seeking second opinions, and becom-
ing involved in innocence projects); Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A
Proposalfor a Third Generation of Wrong/ul Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1219, 1237 (2005) (urging that the innocence movement focus not only on creating
more reliable science, lineups, and confessions but also on structural changes in the justice
system, including, most importantly, an examination of how prosecutors control dockets);
Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV.
171, 239 (2005) (advocating more prosecutor involvement in obtaining exculpatory and
technical information and assisting defendants with their claims of innocence after being
convicted, and urging that ethical rules more specifically cover prosecutors' post-conviction
actions).
45. See generallyJudith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecu-
tors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 410-12
(2002) (advocating making scientific-testing statutes more effective and proposing model,
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resort almost exclusively to the adversarial process, which has al-
ready failed the innocent defendant.
Vindication of innocence is even more difficult to obtain where
state ethical systems do not impose upon prosecutors a duty to in-
quire into claims of innocence. To be sure, prosecutors have a
constitutional duty to reveal exculpatory information. 46 They also
have ethical duties to "seek justice '47 and to reveal evidence that
tends to "mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the pun-
ishment."8 However, in the cases of innocent persons who have
been convicted and sentenced but who continue to, or for the first
time, claim innocence, prosecutors have no ethical duty to assist
in investigating such claims.
All convicted defendants face significant limitations on introduc-
ing newly discovered evidence under rules of procedure,0 and they
have only limited access to federal habeas corpus.5' To have any
post-conviction ethical obligations for prosecutors, including requirements to seek truth,
continue to reveal exculpatory evidence, and utilize the most accurate scientific methods);
Mark Lee, The Impact of DNA Technology on the Prosecutor: Handling Motions for Post-Conviction
Relief 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 663, 666-67 (2001) (advocating cooperation among prosecutors
and defense attorneys, at least where evidence may be tested for DNA and the court has
provided funding for the testing).
46. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's fail-
tire to reveal material, exculpatory information relating to guilt or punishment violates Due
Process).
47. See, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n 2007) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate; it is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
48. Id.
49. See Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 45, at 410-12.
50. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b) (1) ("Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly dis-
covered evidence must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an
appeal is pending, the court may not grant a motion for a new trial until the appellate court
remands the case.").
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000) (limiting habeas corpus to a violation of the
United States Constitution, laws, or treaties); id. § 2244(b) (limiting successive applications
for the writ of habeas corpus); id. § 2244(d)(1) (mandating a "1-year period of limitation...
to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a State court"); id. § 2254(a) (limiting habeas for state prisoners to violations of "the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"); id. § 2255 (indicating the habeas
access of federal prisoners and also imposing a requirement that habeas petitions be filed
within one year from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final" or from
"the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been dis-
covered through the exercise of due diligence").
"As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may support federal habeas relief only
if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice from the asserted error."
House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (U.S. 2006) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485
(1986). In House, the Supreme Court concluded that:
A petitioner's burden at the gateway stage [to merit a hearing] is to demonstrate that
more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find
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new facts considered, defendants must meet the Supreme Court's
extraordinarily high burden of finding and proving that new evi-
dence is more likely than not to convince any reasonable juror to
have reasonable doubt about guilt.52 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court requires that to prevail on a habeas corpus petition,' a peti-
tioner must not only produce new evidence but must also
"demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the new evi-
dence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.,54 Thus, after trial, the innocent, albeit con-
victed, defendant's vindication becomes almost impossible because
appellate and habeas corpus decisions are almost always predicated
on questions of law, not questions of fact. A jury's decision to find
an innocent person guilty is always incorrect, but legal mechanisms
make reversal of the erroneous verdict almost impossible to ob-
tain.55
III. REFORMING THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM: TRUTH TO
VINDICATE INNOCENCE
The purpose of innocence procedures is to discover whether a
defendant's claim of innocence is truthful. The innocence proce-
dures advanced here consist of, first, pre-trial investigations and
inquiries and, second, protective jury instructions at trial. The pro-
cedures begin with the adoption of the "innocent" plea, while
retaining the traditional pleas of guilty and not guilty. A defendant
could invoke innocent procedures when he would normally plead
guilty or not guilty, that is, at the arraignment on an indictment,
complaint, or other final accusatory instrument.
The defendant's innocent plea would trigger pre-trial investiga-
tions that focus on determining the truth of the defendant's
innocence claim rather than on collecting evidence sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The difference in the focus
of government investigators, from proving guilt to investigating
innocence, would be monumental. The justice process in a particu-
lar case would be converted from an adversarial contest to an
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt--or, to remove the double negative, that more
likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt.
Id. at 2077.
52. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2076-77; see also supra text accompanying note 51.
53. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255.
54. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2077.
55. See Griffin, supra note 10, at 1292-94.
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inquisitorial inquiry.56 While the government's investigators would
still work closely with prosecutors, they would look at evidence dif-
ferently, trying to determine whether it pointed toward innocence
instead of evaluating whether it would be sufficient to convince a
jury of the defendant's guilt.
The change in focus would mean that investigators would scru-
tinize evidence more thoroughly and at a much earlier stage of the
justice process. To some extent, if it proceeded to trial, the gov-
ernment would have to disprove the defendant's claim of
innocence or, at a minimum, defend its investigation of innocence,
a significant additional evidentiary burden. Thus, the government
would be more circumspect about its own witnesses and more open
to defense witnesses. In evaluating evidence and following defense
leads, government investigators would communicate more freely
and have more discussions with members of the defense team.
New jury instructions at trial would permit the jury to draw in-
ferences favorable to the defendant upon finding an incomplete
government investigation or an investigation conducted in bad
faith. Government agents would thus have to testify at trial about
the vigor with which they pursued the defendant's innocence
claim. To avoid adverse jury instructions and the appearance of
pre-judging the evidence and, thus, any resultant jury perception
of government incompetence or animus toward the defendant,
government investigators would have powerful and compelling in-
centives to investigate innocence claims completely and with the
utmost integrity.
An important qualification is essential. Under innocence proce-
dures, the government would not be required to conduct any
investigation at the behest of a defendant. However, as noted be-
low, the government would sustain adverse jury instructions for
failing to conduct an investigation. Indeed, the government should
not be at the mercy of a defendant intent on misleading its investi-
gators or exhausting its resources. Thus, to the extent that a
56. The inquisitorial system is characterized by a judge who "plays the pivotal role in
adducing the facts and deciding every case." Gerald Walpin, America's Adversarial and Jury
Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 175-76 (2003) (concluding
that the adversarial system is more rational than and superior to the inquisitorial system).
But see Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search
for an Alternative to the Adversaria 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183-84 (2005) (arguing that a
fully adversarial American system, at least in regard to civil law, arose as late as 1938, with the
merger of law and equity, and that some inquisitorial devices survived. "[T]he truth is that
inquisitorial procedure is neither alien to our traditions nor inherently unfair. As late as the
nineteenth century, Anglo-American courts of equity (from which, in fact, masters originally
emerged) employed a mode of procedure, which like that used in the courts of continental
Europe, derived from the Roman-canon tradition and thus was significantly inquisitorial.").
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jurisdiction might formulate innocence procedures to require an
investigation, the government should always have the right to ask
the court to issue an order preventing defendants from improperly
invoking innocence procedures.
To counter the government's decision not to conduct an inno-
cence investigation, and so long as he pleaded "innocent," the
defendant would be entitled to several favorable jury instructions.
Those instructions would: (1) mandate a higher burden of proof
than reasonable doubt; (2) permit an inference of innocence from
a plea of innocent; (3) allow a favorable inference from a prompt
claim of innocence; (4) allow an inference that uninvestigated evi-
dence is favorable to the defendant; and (5) permit acquittals
where the government has acted in bad faith in failing to conduct
an innocence investigation. In practice, the new jury instructions
would increase significantly the likelihood of an acquittal if the
government failed to conduct an innocence investigation or did
not file a motion with the court to avoid a vexatious or improper
innocent plea and the procedures invoked through such a plea.
Absent such a result, prosecutors would have little motivation to
assist defendants in their claims of innocence.
In return for a government investigation of innocence and
highly favorable jury instructions, a defendant would have to waive
two of all defendants' most sacrosanct constitutional protections-
the right to remain silent57 and the right to have confidential
communications with one's attorney. Indeed, when defendants
claim innocence, they are in essence pleading for an inquisitorial
process in which the prosecution, instead of perhaps a judge in an
inquisitorial system, learns all the facts of the defense case. Unfor-
tunately, the structure of the current adversarial system does not
encourage or even allow innocent persons to invoke any process
similar to innocence procedures. Simply, no innocence procedures
or pleas exist. Except for insanity5 9 and some defenses that offer
57. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that the right to remain silent
applies at almost every civil and criminal proceeding).
58. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) (holding that the
privilege exists even after a client's death); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981) (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to corporations). The secrecy of
communications embodied in the attorney-client privilege is apparently based largely on an
assertion in a treatise by Professor Wigmore. Paul R. Rice, Attorney Client Privilege: The Eroding
Concept of Confidentiality Should be Abolished, 47 DuKE L.J. 853, 859 (1998).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (providing that the burden lies with the defendant to
prove the affirmative defense of insanity); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (outlining the notice re-
quirements of an insanity defense).
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the hope of mitigating mental states,60 pleas are limited to guilty,
not guilty, or nolo contendere.'
In pleading not guilty, innocent as well as factually guilty persons
make a cost-benefit analysis that the possible benefits of proceed-
ing to trial outweigh the risks. Despite the possibility of high costs,
such as a prison sentence, an innocent defendant might make a
moral choice to persist with a plea of not guilty even if the risk of
going to trial outweighs the benefit of pleading guilty. In contrast,
when confronted with the same overwhelming evidence, a differ-
ent innocent person might evaluate the costs and benefits
differently and plead guilty.62 Of course, the values inherent in a
moral decision to persist in a not guilty plea are weighted compo-
nents of the innocent person's cost-benefit calculus.
Through innocence procedures, innocent defendants can better
retain their moral positions and argue honestly for innocence be-
cause, instead of hoping only for acquittal at trial-a tenuous
prospect that might lead to a false guilty plea to avoid a harsh sen-
tence-they would have the right to an innocence investigation
prior to trial. The possibly harsh sentence upon an erroneous con-
viction might be outweighed by the innocence procedures'
requirement that the government investigate the case more thor-
oughly and the possibility that the government's investigation
would induce it to discontinue its prosecution. If a defendant fails
to obtain a pretrial dismissal, the favorable jury instructions
granted by innocence procedures would afford the defendant a
better chance for acquittal at trial. Thus, at least during pre-trial
procedures, innocent persons would be less likely to falsely plead
guilty to avoid a harsh sentence upon conviction.
At the same time, the government could better foster an accu-
rate outcome if, at an appropriate point in the adversarial process,
defendants have the opportunity to assert innocence and receive
material support from the government in the investigation of in-
nocence claims. Even with a new focus on finding truth, innocence
60. Mitigating mental states can be numerous depending on how one categorizes
them. They might include guilty but mentally ill (more a verdict than a plea or defense);
heat of passion justifying conviction of manslaughter but not murder; and extreme emo-
tional disturbance, a type of extreme recklessness that reduces murder to manslaughter. See
generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 (1980).
61. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a) (pleas available in the federal system include "not guilty,
guilty, or (with the court's consent) nolo contendere").
62. An innocent person may plead guilty even while professing innocence before a
court. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a
guilty plea can be made voluntarily and intelligently, and does not constitute a compelled
plea in violation of the Fifth Amendment, where the defendant indicated he was innocent
but pleaded guilty only to avoid the death penalty.
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procedures would be consistent with current law and rules that re-
quire the government to provide defendants with significant
material assistance, such as attorneys,63 discovery materials,64 and
expert witnesses.5 The development of innocence procedures
would not alter attorneys' ethical approaches, fact-finding, or legal
work, but the procedures would instill a different motivation in
investigators when a defendant asserts innocence. The focus of the
justice process would be on finding evidence that showed what
really happened rather than on trying to collect just enough evi-
dence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In an adversarial system, innocent defendants-like guilty de-
fendants-are entitled to resort to any legally acceptable strategy to
secure freedom.6 Defense attorneys who find witnesses that pro-
vide incriminating evidence are duty-bound not to reveal the
witnesses to prosecutors. In contrast, prosecutors are always
63. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (concluding that state-
funded counsel is a constitutional right of indigent criminal defendants).
64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (directing release, upon the defendant's request, of
statements, physical evidence, and reports and examinations, including those of experts).
65. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that Due Process requires
the government to provide an indigent defendant with a psychiatrist where the defendant
showed that his sanity would be a significant issue at trial and where a psychiatrist would be
needed to resolve relevant issues, such as future dangerousness).
66. See, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (N.Y State Bar
Ass'n 2007) ("The advocate may urge any permissible construction of te law favorable to
the client, without regard to the lawyer's professional opinion as to the likelihood that the
construction will ultimately prevail.").
67. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduc4 Rule 1.6(a)
(Confidentiality of Information), provide that a "lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6(a) (2007). Of course, presumably no factually guilty client
would ever permit his defense attorney to inform the prosecution of a witness who could
inculpate the defendant. Rule 1.6(b) (1-6) of the Model Rules does permit attorneys, without
having to obtain permission from a client, to reveal information related to the representa-
tion of a client in some instances, such as when death or a crime of fraud might occur if the
information is not revealed. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6(b)(1-6). How-
ever, the permissible instances do not permit revealing the existence of an incriminating
witness without the informed consent of the client. To illustrate a similar state rule, the NEW
YORK LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (B) (2007), provides that a
lawyer shall not knowingly "[rieveal a confidence or secret of a client," id. 4-101 (B) (1) or
"[u]se a confidence or secret of a client to the disadvantage of a client" id. 4-101 (B) (2). The
New York Code provides instances, similar to those in the American Bar Association's Model
Rules, when a lawyer "may" reveal confidences or secrets, none of which permit revealing
witnesses whose testimony might be adverse to the interests of the defendant. Id. 4-
101(C) (1-5). The New York Code defines "confidence" and "secret" broadly and would
seem always to prohibit a defense attorney from revealing the existence of an adverse wit-
ness. "'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relation-
ship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. 4-101 (A).
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bound to reveal exculpatory evidence 8 and seek justice. 9 However,
in bringing charges, prosecutors indicate their determination to
harm the interests of the defendant, whom the prosecutor pre-
sumably believes is guilty.70 The adversarial system promotes this
confrontational process and does not require, at any stage, a for-
mal consideration of whether a defendant is innocent.
IV. INNOCENCE PROCEDURES WITHIN THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
Prior to trial and without suffering adverse consequences, every
defendant should have the right to plead innocent and invoke
what I have termed "innocence procedures." If defendants did
nothing, then no part of the current adversarial process would
change. There would be no diminution in defendants' rights
unless they waived them in exchange for the benefits of the inno-
cence procedures. The procedures would be a benefit conferred by
the states and federal government and would be consistent with
the authority of the states to provide defendants, or citizens in
other contexts for that matter, with rights beyond those provided
by the federal Constitution.7 Innocence procedures could be de-
signed so that only innocent persons or the most reckless guilty
persons would likely choose to plead innocent. 
72
68. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (mandating the disclosure of excul-
patory evidence that affects guilt or punishment).
69. See, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2007) ("The re-
sponsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; it is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a)-(b) (requiring
prosecutors to have probable cause before bringing any charge and to "make reasonable
efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel").
70. See generally N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) ("A pub-
lic prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted
criminal charges when he or she knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by
probable cause.").
71. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (concluding that the Court will
not review state court decisions resting on "adequate and independent state grounds").
72. That is, for rational, strategic reasons, few guilty defendants would try to compel
innocence procedures if doing so required them to submit to questioning under oath. One
can surmise that such a guilty defendant would always lie to prosecutors and deny involve-
ment in the charged crime, which would open the defendant to a charge of perjury. At a
minimum, the defendant's statement would fix the defense theory of the case at an early
stage, thus preventing the defense from adapting to the prosecution's evidence and strategy.
Invariably, guilty defendants who lie will offer some truthful information to try to convince
investigators of their veracity and innocence, which can lead to witnesses and evidence that
contradict the defendant's claims. More often, defendants might simply fabricate a story,
which prosecutors can investigate and refute, thus showing jurors at trial that the defendant
lied to protect his interests and allowing prosecutors to argue that he lied to hide his crime.
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If jurisdictions did adopt innocence procedures, the three main
components of the procedures would consist of (1) the govern-
ment's obligation to investigate particularized claims of innocence,
(2) the defendant's obligation to submit to questioning and to re-
veal some communications with his attorney, and (3) the court's
obligation to provide jury instructions favorable to a defendant
who has complied with his innocence obligations and to instruct
the jury when the prosecution has not properly complied with its
duty to investigate innocence claims faithfully. These procedures
would be available prior to and during trial, but a separate proce-
dural system could be devised for post-verdict and post-conviction
innocence claims. In choosing to enter a formal plea of innocent,
defendants would open themselves and their attorneys and wit-
nesses to an inquiry by the government. However, in making an
innocence claim, like pleading not guilty, defendants would also
place an obligation on the government. In the current system, the
prosecutor's obligation is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Alternatively, in a system containing innocence procedures,
the prosecutor would receive assistance from the defendant to dis-
cover the truth and would be motivated to do so by the imposition
at trial of a higher standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Obligations of Defendants
To invoke innocence procedures, defendants would have to re-
linquish the more protective procedures used in criminal litigation
in favor of procedures more common in civil litigation 3 and
73. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (pleading special matters), 9 (signing of pleading, mo-
tions, and papers), 11 (depositions), 27 (interrogatories), 33 (interrogatories to parties), 36
(requests for admission). Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide an existing
basis for innocence procedures because they are more focused on arriving at truth than are
the federal and state rules of criminal procedure, which revolve around the beyond-the-
reasonable-doubt standard and where the defense attorney is obligated to work to free the
defendant, even if the attorney knows the defendant is guilty and the attorney is hiding the
truth. See supra note 67. Perhaps most significantly, through interrogatories and depositions,
the Civil Rules permit adverse parties to question each other, a procedure not currently
available to prosecutors but which would be authorized under innocence procedures (that
is, prosecutors' interviews of defendants under oath). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, in essence, already require both the prosecution and defense to assist each
other's investigation through the production, via subpoena, of "books, papers, documents,
data, or other objects the subpoena designates." FED. RULE CRIM. P. 17(c) (1). Indeed, upon
a defendant's request, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (Discovery and Inspection)
requires the prosecution to produce a wide variety of documents and objects, id. 16(E), as
well as information about or statements obtained from the defendant, id. 16(a)(1) (A)-(D).
Innocence procedures would require an additional step in that the prosecution would have
to investigate defense leads based on available information or face unfavorable jury
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inquisitorial processes. 4 Initially, to invoke innocence procedures,
defense attorneys would have to file an affidavit or affirmation in-
dicating that upon information, belief, and investigation their
clients' claims of innocence are true. Of course, attorneys whose
clients admitted guilt in a confidential communication could not
file an affidavit or affirmation truthfully asserting innocence.
Those clients could not invoke innocence procedures.
An illustration of how innocence procedures can be invoked ex-
ists in the federal civil system, where Rule 11 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires that every pleading, written motion, or
other paper must be signed by the attorney of record. 5 Rule 11 (b)
directs that:
By presenting a pleading, written motion or other paper to
the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later ad-
vocating, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and be-
lief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances ... the claims, defenses, and other legal con-
tentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law or the establishment of new law ... the
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evi-
dentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and ... the denials of factual con-
tentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
76
Similarly, in criminal cases, the defense attorney's affirmation
would indicate the attorney's belief in his client's assertion of inno-
cence and encompass the existence of a prior investigation leading
to and supporting the attorney's affirmation of innocence. In the
civil system, courts can sanction attorneys and their clients for vio-
instructions at trial if failing to do so. However, innocence procedures would not require the
prosecution to produce contact information of prosecution witnesses, such as those who
might face threats.
74. Specifically, defendants would have to submit to questioning, as do persons under
investigation in inquisitorial systems and parties in civil litigation. See Walpin, supra note 56,
at 176; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (depositions), 27 (interrogatories). Parties may take the
oral, id. 30(a)(1), or written, id. 31(a)(1), depositions of any person and may serve an inter-
rogatory on any party, id. 33(a).
75. Id. 11 (a).
76. Id. lI(b).
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lations of the rules, such as making statements or filing papers
without a proper factual or legal basis." Innocence procedures
would provide for similar sanctions against criminal defense attor-
78
neys.
It can be argued that an attorney affirmation requirement on
innocence would inhibit communication between the attorney and
the client. To an extent, this is true, but no more so than in civil
litigation and only for factually guilty defendants in criminal litiga-
tion who wish to raise a false claim of innocence to obtain the
benefits of innocence procedures. The factually innocent defen-
dant would have discussed his case freely with his defense attorney.
The attorney and the innocent defendant would have made a deci-
sion that it is more advantageous to invoke innocence procedures
than to continue with the current, conventional adversarial proc-
ess. However, in invoking innocent procedures, the attorney and
defendant would indirectly reveal the fundamental component of
their communications-the defendant's assertion of innocence to
the attorney, which would be conveyed to the government through
the attorney's affirmation that he has a good faith basis in believing
that the defendant is innocent.79
77. See id. 11 (c).
78. A reverse exclusionary rule might develop in cases where defendants plead inno-
cent and assist their attorneys in making false statements or engaging in improper conduct.
Such an exclusionary rule would apply when defendants or defense attorneys engage in
intentional, knowing, and, possibly, reckless misconduct.
79. A competent innocent client might refuse to communicate with his defense attor-
ney. If the client did not communicate assent to a plea of innocent and the invocation of
innocence procedures, the attorney could not submit an innocence affirmation. The case
would proceed like every current case in which the client does or does not communicate
with the defense attorney.
Further, in cases involving mentally incompetent defendants, the innocent defen-
dant/client who is unable to communicate innocence to his defense attorney would be
unable effectively to assist in his defense and, like all similar defendants, would not be com-
petent to stand trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2000) (a defendant is incompetent if there is
reasonable cause to believe he "may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the na-
ture and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense");
see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (concluding that the "test [for com-
petency] must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as fac-
tual understanding of the proceedings against him"). Often detained in a mental institution
until found competent to be tried, the incompetent innocent defendant would suffer more
harm than would the incompetent guilty defendant. Innocence procedures might allow for
defense attorneys, without the client's assent-because he is incapable of assenting-and
with a court's approval, to provide normally confidential or privileged information to prose-
cutors in an effort to aid the innocent incompetent defendant who is being held in a mental
institution awaiting a trial. The information provided by the defense attorney might vindi-
cate the client, but be inaccessible to the client simply because of his mental or emotional
deficiency (which requires institutionalization until competent). Innocence procedures
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For whatever reason, some innocent defendants might refuse to
communicate exculpatory information to their attorneys, or some
guilty defendants might lie to their attorneys. In both instances,
attorneys would lack the foundation to make and file an affirma-
tion of innocence, assuming they perceived the guilty client's lie.
Where the competent defendant did not communicate, the de-
fense attorney either could not faithfully affirm that the client was
innocent or, even where independent evidence indicated inno-
cence, the attorney could not make the affirmation without the
client's permission. However, the competent defendant who does
not discuss his culpability but, nonetheless, consents to his attor-
ney's affirmation of innocence would be presumed to have asserted
his innocence. This presumption would be necessary to prevent
guilty defendants from acquiring the benefits of innocence proce-
dures, such as an enhanced government investigation, and then
claiming they need not submit to questioning because, given their
silence, they never, in fact, asserted their innocence.
Some incompetent defendants might not know that they are fac-
tually innocent. Even without knowing, they should be entitled to
have their attorneys affirm innocence on their behalf so long as the
attorneys conduct a good faith investigation that, in the attorney's
belief, indicates innocence. As in any civil or criminal case, attor-
• 80
neys could be sanctioned for making frivolous innocence claims.
The process for the defense attorney in asserting a good faith
basis of innocence would be similar to what attorneys must do to81
file and litigate civil cases or to make pre-trial motions in criminal82
cases. Civil attorneys must file only cases they believe to have
might provide that such privileged and confidential information could not be used in the
prosecution's case-in-chief at trial, assuming the defendant becomes competent to stand
trial, unless the defendant, when competent, ratifies his attorney's decision. In almost all
other instances, innocence procedures would allow the prosecution to introduce the privi-
leged and confidential information (submitted voluntarily by the defense) in its case-in-
chief. Even if the information were not allowed in the prosecution's case-in-chief, it could be
allowed to impeach any defendant who testifies at trial. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
226 (1971) (allowing the prosecution to impeach a testifying defendant with prior inconsis-
tent statements that the government obtained illegally and could not introduce against the
defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (authorizing the imposition of "an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) [Representations
to Court] or are responsible for the violation"); see also N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)-(B) (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 2007) (prohibiting false statements and
furthering a client's fraud).
81. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. See FED. R. CraIM. P. 12 (pleadings and pretrial motions); FED. R. CRIM. P. 47 (mo-
tions and supporting affidavits). That is, given the structure of the Federal Rules, which
already focus on pre-trial matters, innocence procedures could be encompassed within addi-
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merit. 3 Similarly, given innocence procedures, criminal defense
attorneys who learn of their clients' factual guilt through confiden-
tial conversations or independent investigations would be unable
to assert innocence claims. In a system incorporating innocence
procedures, defense attorneys would have to submit any recorded
communications with their clients to the prosecution. This would
be similar to the requirement in current criminal cases that prose-
cutors and defense attorneys must reveal the prior statements of
witnesses they call at trial (except for the defendant's prior state-
ments) ,4 a requirement that itself is similar to the deposition and
discovery process in civil cases, where the parties must disclose vir-
tually all relevant requested information. 5
Factually guilty defendants could almost never avail themselves
of innocence procedures because, assuming some minimal level of
attorney-client communication, their attorneys could not affirm a
good faith belief in innocence. Even if a defense attorney was not
certain of a client's innocence, the attorney would be unlikely to
proceed with an innocence claim because it could provide prose-
cutors with the opportunity to acquire potentially incriminating or
devastating evidence from the questioning of the client. Factually
guilty defendants might claim that they could not communicate
freely with their attorneys because doing so would mean that their
attorneys could not affirm their clients' innocence and, thus, with-
out an affirmation, factually guilty defendants could not plead
innocent and receive the benefits of innocence procedures. Of
course, the goal of innocence procedures would be to adduce pre-
cisely this result, leaving the procedures available only to
defendants who know they are factually innocent.
tional rules, although the process leading to a separate statutory authorization might pro-
mote a wider discussion of innocence procedures.
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)-(b) (2) ("By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attor-
ney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law ... ").
84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (requiring the prosecution and defense to turn over the prior
statements of their witnesses after the witnesses testify on direct examination, except that the
defense is not required to turn over the defendant's prior statements).
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (deposition upon oral examination); FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (depo-
sitions upon written questions); FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories to parties). The disclosure
of additional information in criminal cases, like the broader disclosure in civil cases, would
help place a focus on discovering truth rather than maintaining a strict focus on determin-
ing whether the available evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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A defense attorney's affirmation of innocence would entitle the
defendant to innocence procedures, namely an enhanced prosecu-
torial investigation and favorable jury instructions, so long as the
defendant complied with additional discovery requirements. As in
civil litigation, the defendant would have to submit to more exten-
sive discovery and questioning under oath. To prevent defendants
from frivolously invoking innocence procedures and violating dis-
covery obligations, the government would be entitled to use at trial
any affirmation, pleading, or evidence it acquired in the course of
its innocence investigation, while the violating defendant would
not be entitled to any legal benefits under the innocence proce-
dures, such as the favorable jury instructions. Similarly, the
prosecutor who violated the innocence procedures would not be
entitled to use any evidence acquired from the defendant, except
perhaps in impeaching a defendant who testifies falsely, 7 while the
defendant would acquire all of the benefits of the innocence pro-
cedures, mainly the highly favorable jury instructions.
B. Obligations of Prosecutors and the Government
A main purpose of innocence procedures is to induce the gov-
ernment to conduct an enhanced pre-trial investigation and not
pursue cases that might normally proceed to trial without an en-
hanced investigation. Of course, even after an enhanced
investigation, the government will proceed to trial in some cases.
Defendants who have pleaded innocent and opened themselves to
inquisitorial scrutiny should be entitled to rely on legal procedures
to provide a counterbalance to the advantage that the government
obtains through acquiring a defendant's statements, attorney-client
communications, and evidence. These procedures would be neces-
sary when the prosecution remained convinced of the defendant's
guilt and refused to halt the prosecution or offer an acceptable
plea agreement.SS
86. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing how oral and written
depositions in a civil case could provide a basis for some innocence procedures in a criminal
case).
87. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (permitting the state to use ille-
gally obtained statements from the defendant in its cross-examination of the defendant,
where the defendant's trial testimony contradicted his prior, illegally obtained, statements).
88. An innocent defendant might choose to plead guilty after making a cost-benefit
analysis. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (permitting a guilty plea by a
defendant who claimed he was innocent but wished to plead guilty to avoid a possible death
sentence).
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Even if a defendant invoked innocence procedures, the prosecu-
tion might not faithfully initiate or complete an investigation. The
trial judge would have little legal authority or practical ability to
compel prosecutors to perform a more extensive investigation. "
However, prosecutors would have strong motivations to conduct
sufficient investigations because defendants who assert innocence
will be entitled to highly favorable jury instructions at trial. The
jury would be instructed, for example, that the absence of a gov-
ernment investigation to recover evidence reasonably available to
the government indicates that the evidence does, indeed, indicate
innocence, even in the absence of the introduction of the evidence
at trial. 0 Therefore, the failure of the government to conduct an
adequate innocence investigation would increase the likelihood of
acquittal significantly.
Through the invocation of innocence procedures, the trust that
defendants place in prosecutors need not be blind because the
presumptions and jury instructions triggered by the procedures
would provide defendants with the means to counter unscrupulous
or unreasonable prosecutors. As for reasonable prosecutors, when
presented with additional evidence, some of them would discon-
tinue a prosecution, but others would find that the defendants'
statements and evidence did not indicate innocence and would
proceed to trial. If innocent defendants' only option was to simply
89. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide little or no authority to judges to
review the discretionary decisions of prosecutors, except perhaps for approving guilty pleas.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b). The government possesses broad discretion over whom to prose-
cute. SeeWayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (concluding that the decisions
of government prosecutors must be within constitutional bounds but that courts have little
authority or competence to oversee prosecutors).
90. Ajury instruction on missing evidence has precedent in the "missing witness" jury
instruction, which creates an adverse inference toward a party that does not produce a ma-
terial witness who is solely within the party's control or about whom only the party has
knowledge. See, e.g., PATTERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE
FIRST CIRCUIT § 2.11, available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/crpji.97nov.pdf
("If it is peculiarly within the power of the government to produce a witness who could give
material testimony, or if the witness would be favorably disposed to the government, failure
to call the witness mayjustify an inference that his/her testimony would be unfavorable to
the government. No such inference is justified if the witness is equally available or favorably
disposed to both parties or if the testimony would merely repeat other evidence."); see also
United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The first thing that must be
shown before a party can raise to the jury the possibility of drawing an inference from the
absence of a witness is that the absent witness was peculiarly within the other party's power
to produce. This requirement is met both when a witness is physically available only to the
opposing party and when the witness has a relationship with the opposing party 'that would
in a pragmatic sense make his testimony unavailable to the opposing party regardless of
physical availability' . . . . The second thing that must be shown is that the testimony of the
witness would elucidate issues in the case. 'No inference is permissible ... where the unpre-
sented evidence would be merely cumulative.'") (internal citations omitted).
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trust the prosecutor, they would be unlikely ever to invoke inno-
cence procedures, especially since the prosecution office entrusted
with the innocence investigation was the very office that brought
formal charges against them. Defendants should not be placed in a
position worse than they would have occupied had they never in-
voked innocence procedures. They should be able to counter the
government's advantages.
First, and most significantly, when the defendant invokes and
submits to innocence procedures, the government will be required
to prove guilt to a higher level of certainty.9' After the government
has acquired the defendant's statements and witnesses' statements,
it will have a significant strategic advantage if it refuses to discon-
tinue its prosecution and proceeds to trial. The prosecution will be
aware of almost all of the defense evidence and have ample time to
counter it and to prepare to cross-examine defense witnesses and
offer and prepare rebuttal witnesses. To offset these advantages,
the prosecution should have the burden of proving the defendant
guilty to a level higher than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stan-
dard.92 This standard might encompass guilt to a moral certainty,93
or as proposed in the sentencing phase of capital cases, to an abso-
lute certainty,94 proof beyond all reasonable doubt,95 or to a
91. Although the defendant's plea would be "innocent," the jury's verdict must not
consist of a choice between innocent and not innocent. Such a choice would deprive the
defendant of the presumption of innocence and place upon him the burden of proving
innocence. The jury's choice in verdicts should be between whether the prosecution has
proven guilt to the level of the higher standard or not proven guilt to that level.
92. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt is the standard that the prosecution must meet in all criminal cases).
93. But see, Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 450 (2005)
(questioning a standard of moral certainty because "what seems morally certain will depend
upon facts as we know them at a given time.... [and] facts sometimes turn out to be quite
shaky").
94. See generally Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 Am. CRIM. L.
REv. 45, 71 (2005) (acknowledging the need for more certainty in capital cases but question-
ing the usefulness of higher standards of proof and urging jury instructions that jurors will
likely follow). Lillquist argues:
A large number of theories for justifying the standard of proof exist. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, on none of these theories is there an ineluctable conclusion that death penalty
cases ought to involve a higher standard of proof than ordinary criminal cases. The
best case can be made tnder a balance of the harms approach, while a good case can
be made (depending upon the assumptions one is willing to accept) on a balance of
the errors approach. Other theories, though, seem to have no criteria on which to
justify the use of a higher standard for capital cases.
Id. at 71-72.
95. See Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof Beyond all Possible Doubt: Is There a
Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May be Death?, 78 CHl.-KENT. L. REv. 1359,
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similarly high standard. Regardless, the standard must be greater
than beyond a reasonable doubt."
Second, the defendant who claims innocence should be entitled
to favorable legal inferences and presumptions. Judges should in-
struct jurors that they may draw inferences favorable to defendants
who claim innocence, waive their right to remain silent, and reveal
confidential communications, at least indirectly through defense
attorney affirmations. Jurors could infer that such defendants be-
lieve they are innocent in the manner in which prosecutors ask
jurors to infer that a defendant believes he is guilty based on ac-
tions or statements indicating his "consciousness of guilt." v Indeed,
innocence procedures would permit the defendant to argue to the
jury that his actions indicated a consciousness of innocence.
In addition, the defendant might point to additional actions that
indicate innocence, such as a present or prompt outcry or a will-
ingness immediately to speak to law enforcement personnel.
Prosecutors regularly ask jurors to draw an inference that a com-
plainant (often in sexual assault cases) is credible because the
complaint was made promptly or within a reasonable time.9 Using
1368 (2003) (urging the adoption of a beyond-all-possible-doubt standard in capital cases).
"The beyond all possible doubt standard asks the jury to be absolutely certain of its factual
findings before it may proceed to the penalty phase; this means that the jury should con-
sider any residual doubts--doubts that fall in the margin between reasonable doubt and
absolute certainty." Id.
96. One rationale for the higher standard is that it compensates defendants for dis-
closing their evidence to the prosecution. However, a second and perhaps equally important
reason is that the prosecution should be held to a higher standard in cases where the defen-
dant has shown that there is a higher than normal risk of convicting an innocent person.
This second rationale would recognize that some verdicts might be "unsafe." See Risinger,
supra note 15, at 1315 ("[Tlhe 'against the weight of the evidence' decision [used to review
jury verdicts] provides no functional protection of the reasonable doubt standard. And on
appeal the protection is even more diluted because the court is called upon to defer to the
trial court's decision and reverse only for abuse of discretion. By this time, the soup is too
thin to contain much nourishment at all. In those rare cases in which a criminal verdict of
guilt is found to be against the weight of the evidence, the decision does not trigger double
jeopardy protection, and a new trial will generally follow, subject only to decisions within
prosecutorial discretion.").
97. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND)
CHARGES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY: CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, available at http://
www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/CJI2d.ConsciousnessofGuilt.pdf ("In determining whether
conduct demonstrates a consciousness of guilt, you must consider whether the conduct has
an innocent explanation. Common experience teaches that even an innocent person who
finds himself or herself under suspicion may resort to conduct which gives the appearance
of guilt."). Currently, there is no similar jury instruction on consciousness of innocence.
98. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND)
CHARGES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY: PROMPT OUTCRY, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
cji/1-General/CJI2d.PrompLOutcry.pdf ("If you find that the complaint was made promptly
or within a reasonable time, you may consider to what extent, if any, that fact tends to sup-
port the believability of the witness's testimony.").
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the same rationale-that the timing of a person's conduct or com-
plaint indicates a state of mind-prosecutors regularly ask jurors to
infer a defendant's guilty state of mind from the defendant's si-
lence prior to arrest, a time when it might have been natural for an
innocent person to deny an accusation.99 Prosecutors argue that a
defendant, by remaining silent when a demonstration of inno-
cence would have been natural, makes an admission about his
involvement in the crime that formed the basis of the accusation.
100
The same reasoning applies to the conduct and state of mind of
innocent defendants. Judges instruct juries that a prompt com-
plaint may support a complainant's believability."" They also
permit prosecutors to introduce the defendant's pre-arrest silence
as an exception to the hearsay rule to prove adoption of a state-
ment that implies the defendant is guilty of or involved in a
crime. 10  Similarly, where defendants show that they issued a
prompt statement of innocence, they should receive a jury instruc-
tion that the statement-so long as they also plead innocent and
consent to innocence procedures-permits the jury to draw an in-
ference of innocence.
Third, innocence procedures should provide defendants with
the right to block evidence the government obtains in violation of
its innocence obligations, as well as a favorable jury instruction
when the government does not assist in investigating innocence.
Initially, at trial, judges would prohibit prosecutors who did not
conduct a sufficient investigation from using evidence obtained
from the defendant during the innocence investigation, such as
the defendant's statements. However, that prohibition would place
99. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (stating that a statement is not hearsay and may be admitted
if a party manifests an adoption or belief in the statement's truth). "A 'statement' is (1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person
as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a). A prosecutor would argue that whenever accused of
or implicated in a crime a person would issue a denial. Therefore, the prosecution should
be able to admit at trial evidence that the defendant remained silent when it would have
been natural to deny an accusation, a proposition approved in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 239-40 (1980), where the Court concluded that "[e]ach jurisdiction may formulate its
own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present state-
ments that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative." Id. However, after arrest,
Miranda warnings, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and an invocation of the
right to remain silent, the prosecution's comment on the defendant's silence is "an affront
to the fundamental fairness that the Due Process Clause requires." Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 291 (1986) (distinguishing between the prosecution's use of the defendant's
silence before Miranda warnings and after Miranda warnings, which imply a promise that
silence will not be used against the defendant).
100. See generally discussion supra note 99.
101. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND)
CHARGES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY: PROMPT OUTCRY, supra note 98.
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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the innocent defendant in no better a position than he would be in
if innocence procedures did not exist-fighting to prevent the
prosecutor from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
An additional sanction would be necessary to ensure that the
government assisted in an innocence investigation. Innocence pro-
cedures would mandate ajury instruction on the prosecution's lack
of investigation and would be similar to the common "missing-
witness" jury instruction, which directs that "if a party has it par-
ticularly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony
would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it cre-
ates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be
unfavorable."0 3 A similar instruction would allow the jury to infer
that evidence the prosecution might have uncovered would have
been favorable to the defendant. Thus, jury instructions that re-
ward the defendant for claiming innocence and punish the
government for not properly pursuing evidence of innocence
would induce the government to conduct a thorough investigation.
The government's innocence investigation would be necessary to
overcome the inferences favorable to the defendant resulting from
jury instructions and the higher burden of proof placed on the
prosecution.
V. QUESTIONING INNOCENCE PROCEDURES
One primary potential counterargument to the innocence pro-
cedure model is that a formal plea of innocent might lead jurors to
believe that defendants who plead not guilty are more likely to be
guilty than those who plead innocent. Stated differently, some
might argue that jurors will wield an unrevealed or unconscious
bias against defendants who plead "only" not guilty instead of in-
nocent. This is a fair concern, yet one that is nonetheless muted
for several reasons.1
0 4
In order to oppose innocent pleas based on the foregoing ar-
gument, one would have to presume that jurors would disregard
the trial judge's direction to presume innocence from a plea of not
guilty. To be sure, all jurors bring some preconceptions to the
103. United States v. Anders, 602 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Graves v.
United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893)).
104. It is important to note that in assessing the possible relative effects of implement-
ing innocence procedures, it is only necessary to ensure that jurors do not view defendants
who plead not guilty differently than they view them now, in the absence of innocent pleas.
The justice system should therefore ensure that the existence of innocent pleas and inno-
cence procedures does not affect the presumption of innocence as it applies to defendants
who plead not guilty.
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courtroom. However, jurors' beliefs about the presumption of in-
nocence are no different from jurors' other erroneous and biased
beliefs, which trial judges and attorneys confront regularly at every
stage of every trial, from jury selection to the choice ofjury instruc-
tions.
Nonetheless, to counter fears or the reality of such juror bias
surrounding defendants who plead not guilty in jurisdictions
where formal pleas of innocent exist, a defendant who pleads not
guilty should be entitled to ajury instruction that he has no obliga-
tion to plead innocent or to invoke any type of "special" innocence
procedure. Indeed, the fear that a jury might infer guilt from a de-
fendant's failure to exercise a right that might be widely known to
the public has long been a concern of the justice system. Nonethe-
less, probably the most prominent of such fears was remedied long
ago with a jury instruction that is now routine and unremarkable.
That is, in Bruno v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized
that defendants who choose not to testify have the right to a jury
instruction indicating that their failure to testify does not create
any presumption.' 5 Similarly, a defendant who exercises his right
not to plead innocent and instead pleads not guilty should be enti-
tled to an instruction that the jury should draw no inferences from
his plea.
Moreover, as an equitable matter, defendants who plead not
guilty should not be able to prevent other defendants from plead-
105. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293 (1939). In Bruno, the Court concluded
that a federal statute required the federal trial judge, at the defendant's request, to instruct
the jury that it should draw no presumption from the defendant's failure to testify. Id. The
Court approved the defendant's proposed instruction:
The failure of any defendant to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf,
does not create any presumption against him; the jury is charged that it must not
permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against any such defendant, nor
should this fact enter into the discussions or deliberations of the jury in any manner.
Id. at 292 (quoting the requested jury instruction). In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981),
the Court held that the jury instruction on the defendant's failure to testify is a constitu-
tional requirement when the defendant requests the instruction and that judges must
instruct juries that they may draw no adverse inference from the defendant's silence "to
minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to
testify." Id. at 305. Moreover, the Court stated:
Just as adverse comment on a defendant's silence "cuts down on the privilege by mak-
ing its assertion costly," the failure to limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of
that silence, when the defendant makes a timely request that a prophylactic instruc-
tion be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the full and free exercise of the
privilege.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Truth and Innocence Procedures
ing innocent and distinguishing themselves at trial in a system
where currently a large majority of all defendants, almost all of
whom plead not guilty at some point, are eventually convicted. In
sharp terms, a truly innocent person has no means of preventing
himself from being "infected" in the eyes of the jurors by the pool
of all defendants who plead not guilty, the large majority of whom
are convicted. Thus, if anything, the absence of innocence proce-
dures might create a presumption of guilt for the innocent person
in a system where almost all defendants plead not guilty and where
a large majority of them are later convicted.
In fact, jurors might have very real and accurate perceptions
about defendants in the current justice system. Indeed, at least
90% of federal defendants are convicted via guilty pleas or after
trials,' 0 while at least 68% of state defendants are convicted via
guilty pleas or after trials.'" While 24% of state cases are termi-
nated through dismissals, only 1% of state cases are terminated
through acquittals.0 8 It would be the greatest injustice imaginable
if those guilty defendants could deprive innocent persons of pro-
cedures that they could use to vindicate their innocence and
escape prison. The problem with the current system is not that too
many guilty persons are being convicted, or acquitted for that mat-
ter, but rather that too many innocent persons are being convicted.
Innocence procedures would provide an avenue of hope for inno-
cent persons who are currently indistinguishable from most guilty
persons to the majority ofjurors at trial.
In further opposition to innocence procedures, some might ar-
gue that a defendant who testifies and receives a favorable jury
instruction under innocence procedures would be doing so at the
expense of defendants, some of them innocent, who choose not to
testify. However, the Constitution provides only that a defendant
shall not be punished for not speaking or testifying.'09 It does not
prevent the federal and state governments from providing addi-
tional benefits, especially when states base their decisions on state
106. In the federal system, in 2004, "[c]ases were terminated against 83,391 defen-
dants." BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FEDERALJUSTICE STATISTICS:
SUMMARY FINDINGS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
Ninety percent of the "defendants were convicted. Of the 74,782 defendants convicted,
72,152 (or 96%) pleaded guilty or no-contest." Id.
107. See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FELONY DEFEN-
DANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 24 (2006), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf.
108. See id.
109. See Carter, 450 U.S. at 305 (holding that upon the defendant's request, a judge
must instruct the jury that no inference may be drawn from a defendant's decision not to
testify).
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law." O A favorable jury instruction for testifying is logically no dif-
ferent from a favorable jury instruction for not testifying. Morally,
if one hypothesizes that innocent defendants are more likely than
guilty defendants to testify, then a favorable jury instruction for tes-
tifying is more reasonable than a favorable jury instruction for not
testifying.
Innocence procedures would not affect trials for defendants
who plead not guilty nor would innocence procedures change the
philosophy surrounding the nature of the adversarial system, which
is presumably designed to convict the guilty and free the innocent.
Instead, innocence procedures would move the focus of the system
from accepting some convictions of innocent persons to attempt-
ing to prevent all convictions of innocent persons. Significantly,
when resources are discussed, innocence procedures would affect
only a very small number of cases. In fact, given one estimate, the
conviction rate for felonies that are not dismissed might be over
ninety-eight percent in the federal system."' Assuming that the vast
majority of defendants in those cases are guilty, innocence proce-
dures might be invoked in relatively few of those cases and perhaps
also in the two percent of cases that do not result in convictions.
Innocence procedures might not even affect conviction rates
because the procedures are designed to dispose of cases with dis-
missals when innocent persons convince prosecutors that they are,
indeed, innocent. Thus, prior to trial, dismissals should occur
more frequently, which would reduce the expenditure of govern-
mental resources on trials, appeals, and imprisonment of innocent
persons. In the current system, with its high conviction rates and
what some consider the remote chance of obtaining post-
conviction relief,"1 2 proving innocence at any time is especially dif-
ficult. Innocence procedures offer a method to reduce the number
of convictions of innocent persons by disposing of cases prior to
trial, without reducing the number of convictions of guilty persons.
110. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (holding that federal courts will
not review state court decisions based clearly on adequate and independent state grounds).
111. See Christopher W. Behan, Don't Tug on Superman's Cape: in Defense of Convening Au-
thority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L. REv. 190, 303
n.573 (2003) (finding that, for the year 2001, conviction rates in military general courts
martial and federal criminal trials were 95% and 98.37% respectively).
112. See supra notes 32, 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the small likelihood
of reversals on appeal and via habeas corpus where factual disputes are at issue).
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CONCLUSION
A quest for truth might be the best means through which to free
innocent persons facing conviction within the adversarial system.
When faced with formal charges, innocent persons are at an ex-
treme disadvantage. Believing the innocent person is guilty, the
government has marshaled its resources and is ready to proceed to
trial should the innocent person not accept an offered plea
agreement. In contrast, possessing relatively few resources, inno-
cent persons must rely on the high-risk defense of arguing to the
jury that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proving
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The innocent de-
fendant has only two options. First, he can plead guilty or no
contest ' 3 to lesser but ultimately false charges and suffer a criminal
conviction and probable imprisonment. Second, he can risk the
all-or-nothing outcome of proceeding to trial. In doing so, he will
be acquitted and freed or convicted and imprisoned for a longer
period than if he had falsely pleaded guilty. Without a third alter-
native, an innocent person faces a high risk of conviction and
imprisonment.' 14
The adversarial process should better protect innocent persons
by permitting them to choose or compel procedures that would
help them prove their innocence. Defendants would have to relin-
quish what some would consider their most important rights in an
adversarial system: the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent"5
and, to some extent, the Sixth Amendment right to have confiden-
tial communications with their attorneys." 6 Defendants would also
have to subject almost their entire case to the scrutiny of prosecu-
tors, who would be obligated to examine and seek evidence that
might indicate the defendant's innocence.
Importantly, however, defendants should not be at a disadvan-
tage if they claim innocence, reveal their case to the prosecution,
and then learn that the prosecution is proceeding to trial anyway.
Thus, so as not to prevent innocent persons from claiming inno-
cence (by suffering the disadvantages that would arise from
revealing their evidence), the justice system should provide a
113. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a) (permitting pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo conten-
dere).
114. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 106 (reporting that at least ninety
percent of defendants in the federal system who made it to adjudication of their case were
convicted in 2004); see also Behan, supra note 111, at 303 n.573 (suggesting that 98.37% of
federal defendants whose cases are not dismissed are convicted).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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mechanism for defendants to counter the prosecution's advantage.
At trial, for a defendant who has pleaded innocent, the court
should instruct the jury that:
1. Guilt is based on a standard higher than beyond a
reasonable doubt;
2. Jurors may infer innocence (and a consciousness of
innocence) from the defendant's early claim of in-
nocence, plea of innocent, and waiver of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights after being formally
charged;
3. Jurors may presume that evidence or avenues not
reasonably pursued by the government would have
indicated the defendant's innocence; and
4. Jurors may acquit the defendant if the prosecution
acted in bad faith during the course of the inno-
cence investigation.
In addition, the prosecution should not be permitted to block
innocence procedures unless it can prove to a judge beyond a rea-
sonable doubt why the procedures are inappropriate. This rule is
necessary because prosecutors would benefit from blocking virtu-
ally every defendant's request for innocence procedures. That is, in
bringing formal charges, prosecutors have almost always acquired
what they believe is enough evidence to convict the defendant.
Without compulsory innocence procedures, prosecutors would
have no motive or incentive to investigate further.
The current adversarial system cannot reverse the convictions of
most innocent persons because those convictions result from inves-
tigators', witnesses', prosecutors', judges', and jurors' errors and
mistaken judgments about the facts of a case. Such human error is
not amenable to correction because, practically, the justice system
cannot correct mistaken thinking and, formally, because legal rules
prevent courts from second-guessing jury verdicts."' In addition,
factual errors are difficult to correct because they require the ac-
quisition of additional evidence, which is often impossible for an
incarcerated person to obtain. What the justice system can do,
however, is try to prevent innocent persons from being convicted,
an all too common and tragic occurrence in today's criminal jus-
tice system." 8 While some innocent persons might always be
117. See supra notes 32, 50, 51 and accompanying text (discussing why reversals of jury
decisions are rare).
118. See Gross et al., supra note 4 at 523-24 (indicating that hundreds of convictions of
factually innocent persons occurred within a recent fifteen-year period).
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convicted and incarcerated despite their innocence, the justice sys-
tem can do more to avoid that result. Innocence procedures will
help.

